March 15, 2022
Re: The Resurgence of "Martyrdom," the Possession of Truth, and Søren Kierkegaard
Over the last few years, there has been a notable uptick in interest in martyrdom. For example, according to Google’s Ngram Viewer, the word “martyrdom” is turning up at a rate not seen since the early twentieth century. Indeed, in just the last week, various individuals and groups involved in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been called “martyrs,” including American journalist Brent Renaud, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukrainian Catholics writ large, and even, apparently, ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. Given how disparate these examples are, it goes without saying that “martyrdom” and “martyr” are not being used in univocal fashion. On the contrary, it appears that these words, which have their roots in the Greek term martys (“witness”), are invoked for different reasons and in different contexts.
In any case, despite this renewed popularity, “martyrdom” and “martyr” actually peaked in their frequency of use during the late 1840s and early 1850s, just as Søren Kierkegaard was approaching the end of his authorship. With this in mind, it is notable that, in 1849, Kierkegaard published a short treatise on the question of martyrdom. Entitled “Does a Person Have Permission to Let Himself Be Killed for the Truth?” (Har et Menneske Love til at lade sig ihjelslaae for Sandheden?), and ascribed to the obscure pseudonym H.H., this essay is rooted in a personal dilemma: if one were willing to be martyred for a good cause, would it be uncharitable, and perhaps even morally reprehensible, to allow another person to incur the guilt of being an oppressor? According to H.H., this matter pivots around the degree to which one human being can be “absolutely in possession of the truth.” If one were blameless in relation to others, as Christ was in relation to his persecutors, then martyrdom would be a viable means to the greater good. On the other hand, if one were a fallible and flawed human being, and if one’s cause were only true in a partial or relative way, then there would not be an “absolute difference” between martyr and oppressor. In this scenario, both parties differ as regards the interpretation and/or application of the truth. Consequently, neither side can claim to possess the truth in toto, making it wrong to “let others become guilty in killing [one] for the truth.”
H.H.’s treatise is specifically meant to address martyrdom within the domain of Christendom. And yet, it raises a provocative point about martyrdom in general—a topic that, as has been seen, is bandied about with increasing regularity in today’s media. After all, it is often assumed that the martyr is the “weaker,” more peaceable participant in a conflict. However, H.H. says the opposite: the martyr “compels” (tvinger) his contemporaries to persecute him, insofar as he refuses to yield to his oppressors and thereby embraces conflict with others. In the wrong hands, this power is dangerous. Hence, in a situation of epistemic relativity, H.H. counsels the would-be martyr to consider the example of Christ, who united the truth (Sandheden) with love (Kjerligheden). This love is so deep that it is even willing to give up the power of its cause in order to spare others.
From an 1849 journal entry by Kierkegaard wherein he reflects on this subject: “In the book [“Does a Person Have Permission to Let Himself Be Killed for the Truth?”] a martyrdom is still made possible—namely, to be put to death because one has defended the thesis that a human being does not have the right to let himself be put to death for the truth, since one’s contemporaries would regard this as an enormous arrogance.”
Fascinating & provocative. I hadn't known about this treatise. The connection between love and truth and in particular circumstances consider so deeply in SK. As I was thinking about this, the short chapter "The Victory of Reconciliation in Which Love Wins the Vanquished" in Works of Love seems related to what you've described here. Near the beginning of that chapter: "To battle with the help of the good against the enemy - this is laudable and noble; but to battle for the enemy - and against whom? - against oneself, if you will: this is, yet, this is loving or this is reconciliation in love." Related to your post yesterday, to really trust that reconciliation is actually possible in such a radical way requires giving up the sense control over the narrative you tell about yourself as opponent or as victim and that is so incredibly counter-cultural. Pastorally speaking, the workshop in marriage counseling that I took, this one of the best lessons I took away from it.